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When Lies Go Viral: The First Amendment




In 2017, Dictionary.com added three hundred new words to its website.1
The site adds words and phrases each year that are searched and used most
often, and the 2017 picks offer an alarmingly accurate illustration of the
pressing issues that the United States faces today and the way in which
American citizens talk about those issues.2 Of particular note are the added
phrases “alt-right,” “kompromat,” and “fake news.”3 The term “kompromat”
is a Russian term meaning “compromising and incriminating material that is
sometimes forged or fabricated, used to sabotage or discredit a political op-
ponent or public figure and ultimately destabilize society by causing extreme
doubt and cynicism.”4 The site defines the term “fake news” as “false news
stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared online for
the purpose of generating ad revenue via web traffic or discrediting a public
figure, political movement, company, etc.”5 While the jury is still out on who
coined the term “fake news,”6 the fact that the phrase has been used and
searched enough to merit its being added to a site averaging 5.5 billion word
searches annually is telling.7
The significance and popularity of these terms can be traced to the
United States’ 2016 presidential election, at which time warnings were first
given by the Director of National Intelligence that there were indications of
* Madeleine Rosuck is a 2019 Candidate for a Juris Doctor at SMU Dedman
School of Law. She received a Bachelor of Science in Communication Studies
from the University of Texas at Austin.
1. See AJ Willingham, Hangry, Sext, Alt-Right: Dictionary.com Adds 300 New
Words, CNN (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/health/diction-
ary-com-words-added-trnd/index.html.
2. See id.
3. See Alyssa Pereira, Dictionary.com Adds “Kompromat,” “Fake News,” and




6. See Chris Cillizza, Analysis, Donald Trump Just Claimed He Invented “Fake
News”, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/politics/trump-
huckabee-fake/index.html (noting that Donald Trump claims that he came up
with the term “fake news,” while Merriam-Webster claims that the term was
utilized with regularity starting at the end of the 19th century).
7. See About, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/e/about/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2019).
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cyberattacks against the 2016 presidential election.8 Since then, the U.S. gov-
ernment and judiciary have exposed a litany of evidence and information
substantiating claims regarding interference from foreign countries on the
presidential election.9 The unearthing of this information has led American
citizens and officials to ask: Who let this happen?10
The answer came from a hearing held on Capitol Hill on November 1,
2017, in which the Senate and House Intelligence Committees directed fire at
the leaders of various social media platforms, such as Facebook, Google, and
Twitter.11 During the hearing, the House Intelligence Committee presented
numerous examples of accounts and advertisements that were targeted at
American citizens and voters during the 2016 presidential election.12 The fo-
cus of the hearing was largely the scolding of social media platforms for
“[w]hether knowingly or unknowingly, [helping to] legitimize and spread
Russian disinformation.”13
In society today, there is an ever-growing presence and influence of
social media platforms.14 Americans increasingly rely on these platforms to
receive accurate information.15 With that reliance comes a responsibility to
monitor what is being posted on those sites, not to restrict opinions or speech.
Rather, social media platforms need to ensure that the information dissemi-
8. See Miles Parks et al., 2016 Under Scrutiny: A Timeline of Russia Connections,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/31/5379269
33/2016-under-scrutiny-a-timeline-of-russia-connections.
9. See id.
10. See Nicholas Fandos et al., House Intelligence Committee Releases Incendiary





14. See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewin
ternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (showing roughly sixty percent growth in
number of U.S. adults who use at least one social media site from 2006 to
2017) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180121093422/http://www.pewinternet
.org/fact-sheet/social-media/].
15. See KNIGHT FOUND., AMERICAN VIEWS: TRUST, MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY 3
(2018), https://kf-site-production.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/pdfs/000/
000/242/original/KnightFoundation_AmericansViews_Client_Report_010917_
Final_Updated.pdf (“Underscoring the changing news landscape, equal propor-
tions of Americans rely on social media as rely on newspapers to stay in-
formed.”). But see id. at 2 (“Seventy-three percent of Americans say the spread
of inaccurate information on the internet is a major problem with news cover-
age today.”).
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nated is verified as true and accurate.16 Many media platforms on which
users regularly rely for accurate news and information have enacted policies
to ensure truth and accuracy in the articles and information they circulate.17
For instance, National Public Radio (NPR) has instituted a social media eth-
ics policy aimed at ensuring the content posted on their site, or spoken about
publicly, by their employees is verified as true and accurate.18 Their policy
explicitly demands that employees “[v]erify information before passing it
along,” that employees “[b]e honest about [their] intent when reporting,” and
that employees also “[a]void actions that might discredit [their] professional
impartiality.”19
The reasons for requiring articles, news, and information posted on
these regularly-visited and relied-on sites to be verified as true and accurate
are numerous. In addition to the inherent desire most people have in ob-
taining information that is verified as true and accurate,20 “[t]he unmediated
character of social media speech also increases its potential for sparking vio-
lence.”21 This is because social media platforms inherently allow for a greater
number of people to participate in unmediated communication which in-
creases the probability of incendiary speech and—because of the size of the
online audience—can, in turn, increase the potential for violent reactions to
that speech.22 This is where the First Amendment argument for the protection
of free speech becomes especially important. Proponents of free speech argue
that social media companies have no standing to limit opinions and ideas as
expressed on their platforms.23 These critics have legitimate arguments re-
16. Cf. id. at 2 (noting that the public agrees information needs to be verified but is
split on who should be held responsible for ensuring its accuracy).
17. See, e.g., About The Economist: Fact-Checking Standards, THE ECONOMIST,
https://www.economist.com/about-the-economist#fact-checking-standards (last
visited Feb. 5, 2019); Policies and Standards, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ask-the-post/wp/2016/01/01/policies-
and-standards/.
18. See Social Media, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: NPR ETHICS HANDBOOK, http://ethics
.npr.org/tag/social-media/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
19. See id.
20. See A New Understanding: What Makes People Trust and Rely on News, AM.
PRESS INST. (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publica-
tions/reports/survey-research/trust-news/ (showing survey results that eight-
five percent of respondents “say accuracy is a critical reason they trust a news
source”).
21. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 147, 149 (2011).
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Twitter Faces Censorship Backlash, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jan/27/twitter-
faces-censorship-backlash (explaining that Twitter received considerable back-
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garding the limits of the constraints on free speech.24 However, their argu-
ments fail to address situations in which the speech being promoted is likely,
if not certain, to incite violence, which is a valid and widely-accepted excep-
tion to the protection afforded by the First Amendment.25
This Comment will argue that social media companies have both ethical
and social obligations to monitor the information being shared on their plat-
forms and to ensure that the information shared is verified as true and accu-
rate. Accordingly, this Comment will analyze the arguments presented by
both supporters and opponents of this idea and will supply a reasoned analy-
sis for why the obligations incurred by these social media companies over-
ride the conflicting arguments for complete First Amendment protection.
First, this Comment will provide a summary of the use and influence of so-
cial media platforms due to their reach and prevalence and analyze argu-
ments regarding the responsibilities of social media platforms. Next, this
Comment will analyze the ability of social media platforms to censor infor-
mation. Finally, this Comment will suggest a solution for how to overcome
the conflicting arguments and how to regulate posted information in a way
that both protects free speech and ensures that the information circulated on
these sites is verified as true and accurate.
II. THE REACH AND INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA PLATFORMS
In today’s age, social media platforms are the dominant way in which
Americans receive information.26 In order to understand the sheer scale,
reach, and influence that social media platforms have on users and the infor-
mation they receive, it is important to examine the statistics.
A. Social Media Users
In 2017, sixty-nine percent of Americans were active users of social
media sites.27 Seventy percent of Americans use social media platforms spe-
cifically to “connect with one another, engage with news content, [and] share
lash when the company revealed that it had implemented a system that would
allow the platform to withhold particular tweets from specific countries, on a
case-by-case basis).
24. See Joel Feinberg, Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion, in PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 379, 379 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman, eds., 7th ed. 2004) (explaining
the view of John Stuart Mill that suppression of speech is always worse than
the speech itself).
25. See id.
26. See Chava Gourarie, Censorship in the Social Media Age, COLUMBIA JOURNAL-
ISM REV. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/censorship_in_the_soci
al_media_age.php.
27. Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
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information.”28 Of the major social media platforms, Facebook is the most
widely used.29
B. Facebook
In 2016, nearly thirty-nine percent of the world’s population used
Facebook.30 In fact, Facebook is used in over sixty countries.31 As of 2017,
Facebook had 2.07 billion monthly active users,32 about 1.74 billion of which
were mobile users33 and 1.4 billion of which were active on Facebook
daily.34 Approximately seventy-six percent of American Facebook users
check Facebook at least once a day.35
In addition to these global facts, the statistics of American Facebook
users in 2016—the year of the presidential election—are staggering.
Facebook usage was consistent across various age and ethnic groups.36 In
2016, eighty-one percent of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-nine used
Facebook, and nearly eighty percent of Americans aged thirty to forty-nine
used the site.37 Seventy-three percent of Hispanics used the site, as did sixty-
seven percent of Caucasians and seventy percent of African Americans.38
Interestingly, in 2016, those with an income of $30,000 a year or above uti-
lized the site eleven to eighteen percent more often than those with incomes
below $30,000.39 In addition, those with at least some collegiate education
28. Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
29. Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
30. See Kit Smith, Marketing: 47 Facebook Statistics for 2016, BRANDWATCH
.COM (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/47-facebook-statistics-
2016/.
31. See You Want an Interactive Map of Where Facebook is Used?, THE GUARD-
IAN: TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Jul. 22, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/blog/2010/jul/22/facebook-countries-population-use.
32. Company Info, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2019) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180119182513/https://news
room.fb.com/company-info/].
33. See Number of Mobile Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide from 1st
Quarter 2009 to 4th Quarter 2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista
.com/statistics/277958/number-of-mobile-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
34. Company Info, supra note 32.
35. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
36. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
37. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
38. Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
39. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
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were almost twenty percent more likely to use Facebook than those
without.40
Facebook usage covers all demographics.41 The statistics clearly show
that Facebook crosses national borders, jumps racial and ethnic divides, and
influences people of all ages and socioeconomic statuses.42 For many in these
diverse populations, Facebook has been used not only as a social networking
platform, but increasingly as an information-gathering tool.
C. Politics and Social Media
In 2015, sixty-one percent of Millennials indicated that they looked to
Facebook most often for their political news.43 This trend is telling as the
percentages increase. In addition, Millennials are far less familiar than Gen
Xers and Baby Boomers with other news sources such as The New Yorker,
NPR, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Politico, Bloomberg,
and Breitbart.44 Notably, a quarter of Millennial Facebook users say that ap-
proximately half of the posts they see on Facebook pertain to the government
and politics, but they are less likely to see content on Facebook that supports
their own political and social views.45 This has led to frustration among many
Facebook users searching for political news.46 More than half of social media
users describe their online interactions with social media platforms as both
stressful and frustrating especially because of content they disagree with po-
litically.47 Regardless of the political leanings of the content they encounter,
social media users are overwhelmed with the volume of political content they
encounter online.48 More than one-third of social media users report being
irritated and “worn out” by the sheer amount of political content that they
encounter on social media sites.49
40. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
41. See Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
42. See, e.g., Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 14.; You Want an Interactive
Map of Where Facebook is Used?, supra note 31.
43. See Jeffrey Gottfried & Michael Barthel, How Millenials’ Political News Hab-





46. See Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The Political Environment on Social Me-
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That being said, when it came to the 2016 presidential election, nearly
one-third of eighteen to twenty-nine-year-olds said that social media was the
most helpful source for learning about the election.50 Overall, just over half
of all social network users learned about the presidential election from a so-
cial media site.51 A final interesting statistic about social media site usage
and the presidential election is that while those with higher incomes were
more likely to use social networking sites generally, including to gather in-
formation, lower income users were those more likely to actually share and
rely on election-related content.52
These statistics are important as they indicate the amount of political
information available on social media platforms and the number of people
who rely on this information. In fact, many users—including a growing num-
ber of users without college degrees—indicated that social media platforms
are their primary source of information.53 These statistics are also significant
in that they imply the breadth of the various types of political ideas and
opinions that circulate online. With the sheer amount of information on these
sites, and the number of people who turn to them for information, it is natural
and expected that a social media platform should take responsibility for the
content shared on its site.54
III. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
Considering the extent of the reliance on social media platforms to dis-
tribute an accurate and holistic account of relevant news and information,
there is necessarily a responsibility for social media platforms to regulate, to
a certain extent, the information posted on their sites.55 Due to the increased
use and prevalence of social media, the case has been made that “it is seem-
ingly one’s civic duty to participate in these online services because
‘[p]resence on the Internet is effectively a requirement for fully and effec-
50. See Jeffrey Gottfried et al., The 2016 Presidential Campaign – A News Event





53. See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Plat-
forms 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/
09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ (pointing out that social
media news use is growing among those with less education attainment and
showing no other news source gets more than thirty-three percent consumption
from news consumers on Facebook).
54. See Face Up to Responsibility, Facebook and Friends, FIN. TIMES: THE FT
VIEW (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/eef5c544-ab23-11e6-9cb3-
bb8207902122?mhq5j=e7.
55. See id.
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tively participating in the [twenty-first] century as a citizen.’”56 As such, the
failure of social media platforms to recognize their responsibility to dissemi-
nate accurate information “would open the compan[ies] to liability ‘for
[their] negligence in disseminating tortious material.’”57 Before delving fur-
ther into social media companies’ responsibilities to disseminate accurate in-
formation, it is first necessary to understand why social media platforms
should care about and pay close attention to the information being shared and
promoted on their platforms and why they are under such severe scrutiny for
not doing so.
A. Evidence Supporting the Regulation of Online Platforms
The effects of fake news were seen most prominently during the 2016
presidential election. In late April 2016, Democratic Party National Commit-
tee (DNC) leaders were approached by their Information Technology team
and informed of unusual network activity on their servers.58 Amy Dacey,
Chief Executive Officer of the DNC, spoke with DNC lawyer, Michael Suss-
man, to discuss the severity of the activity.59 Sussman is also a partner at
Perkins Coie in Washington, D.C. and a former federal prosecutor for com-
puter crimes cases.60 Sussman then called Shawn Henry, as President of
CrowdStrike, a cyber firm dedicated to investigating cyber hacking activity.61
CrowdStrike responded immediately by installing software on the DNC’s
computers allowing the team to analyze data showing who gained access,
when they gained access, and how they gained access.62
Eventually, self identified Romanian hacker “Guccifer 2.0” claimed
credit for the hack and leak of documents to the media.63 Some security ana-
56. See Adam Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public
Utilities, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 249, 255 (2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Zeynep Tufekci, Google Buzz: The Corporatization of Social Com-
mons, TECHNOSOCIOLOGY (Feb. 17, 2010), http://technosociology.org/?p=102).
57. See id. at 255 (quoting Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and
Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 155, 170 (Saul Levmore & Martha
C. Nussbaum, eds. 2010)).
58. See Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole








63. See Lauren Carroll, What We Know About Russia’s Role in the DNC Email
Leak, POLITIFACT (July 31, 2016, 6:13 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2016/jul/31/what-we-know-about-russias-role-dnc-email-leak/.
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lysts have since concluded that Guccifer 2.0 is likely to be the public persona
of a Russian hacking group.64 The Office of the Director of National Intelli-
gence corroborated this idea by stating that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) believed, “based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts,
that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized these activi-
ties.”65 Since the beginning of the accusations against Russia, President Vlad-
imir V. Putin has denied involvement.66 However, Putin has previously
referred to the hack as a “public service,” and then-candidate Donald Trump
invited Russian hackers to find the missing emails from the private server
Hillary Clinton used during her time as Secretary of State.67
Despite the overwhelming majority of experts who believe that all of the
evidence points to Russian officials as the culprits of the leak, several experts
are skeptical.68 For example, Jeffrey Carr, Chief Executive Officer of Taia
Global cybersecurity firm, opined that while many of the technical indicators
from this hacking were publicly admitted Russian tactics, he found issue with
Russian motive.69 While it is certainly possible that Russia wanted to help or
hurt certain presidential candidates in one way or another (a reason many
believe to be the basis of the cyberattack), Carr said the evidence provided
seemed purely speculative and could not be considered anything more than a
“conspiracy theory.”70 One expert maintains that an assertion against the
Russians “requires a lot more caution than the media have been giving it thus
far, and [is] something for which we have much less solid evidence.”71
Regardless of these criticisms, the U.S. government subsequently re-
leased two announcements officially accusing the Russian government of the
hack. The first was a letter posted online on December 16, 2016 by the DHS
and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.72 The letter stated that the
cyberattacks were “intended to interfere with the U.S. election process” and
64. See id.
65. See Spencer Ackerman & Sam Thielman, US Officially Accuses Russia of
Hacking DNC and Interfering with Election, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/07/us-russia-dnc-hack-in-
terfering-presidential-election.
66. See Alan Rappeport, New Documents Released From Hack of Democratic
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/us/
politics/dnc-hack.html?_r=0).
67. See id.
68. Carroll, supra note 63.
69. See Carroll, supra note 63.
70. See Carroll, supra note 63.
71. See Carroll, supra note 63.
72. See Pamela Engel, The US has Officially Accused Russia of Hacking the Demo-
cratic Party, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
russia-hacking-democratic-party-dnc-leaks-2016-10.
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accused senior officials in the Russian government of approving the hacking
activity.73 The second announcement was a more thorough investigative re-
port issued jointly by the FBI and DHS linking the Russian government to
the hacks of the Democratic Party organizations.74 It also provided technical
details regarding the mechanisms used by Russian civilian and military intel-
ligence services to “compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associ-
ated with the U.S. election.”75 The report goes on to state that the U.S.
government confirmed that two different Russian intelligence services partic-
ipated in the hacking.76
First, a hacking group, APT 29, began a spearphishing77 campaign in the
summer of 2015. The group sent emails to over 1,000 DNC-affiliated indi-
viduals containing a malicious link to entice recipients to click on it, which
allowed the hackers access to the recipient’s data.78 Second, in the spring of
2016, another hacking group called APT 28 attacked the Democratic party
via targeted spearphishing.79 This time, the sham email tricked users into
changing their passwords via a fake webmail domain hosted on APT 28’s
network.80 APT 28 gained access to and stole the content, leading to the
unauthorized publishing of thousands of emails from multiple DNC senior
party officials.81 Third, according to the investigative report, Russian intelli-
gence services continued to launch spearphising campaigns on the Demo-
cratic party even after the election, up to one day after the national vote was
taken.82
73. Id.
74. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, JAR-16-
20296, GRIZZLY STEPPE – RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 1 (2016)
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZ
ZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf [hereinafter JAR-16-20296]; see also Katie
Bo Williams, FBI, DHS Release Report on Russia Hacking, THE HILL (Dec.
29, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/312132-fbi-dhs-release-
report-on-russia-hacking.
75. JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 1.
76. The hacking groups were assigned different nicknames by different analysts
despite reference to the same groups. See JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 2.
For the sake of consistency, this Comment will refer to the groups as APT 29
and APT 28. Ackerman & Thielman, supra note 65.
77. A spearphishing campaign is when hackers trick users into clicking bogus web-
site links that either deploy malware into the network or direct the user to a
fake webmail domain hosted on the hacker’s network. See Williams, supra
note 74.
78. JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 2–3.
79. See JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 3.
80. JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 3.
81. See JAR-16-20296, supra note 74, at 3.
82. Williams, supra note 74.
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In addition to the fact that the publishing of the leaked emails was dis-
paraging, publishing documents pertaining to campaign strategy also
“weaponized” against the American political system, causing “demonstrable
harm to the national security interests, foreign relations or economy of the
U.S., or the public confidence, civil liberties or public health and safety of
the American people.”83 These significant, complex, and damaging efforts by
foreign entities to influence U.S. elections through the use of technology
should be a major cause of concern to social media platforms. As the infor-
mation regarding the 2016 election hacking scandal exemplifies, there are
people, entities, and governments actively trying to interfere with the United
States’ governmental, societal, and political processes.
There are identified sources who seek to disrupt the functioning of soci-
ety by attempting to incite chaos and wreak havoc.84 Importantly, they are
attempting to do so by infiltrating the internet and abusing various online
sources in different ways.85 Given the extent and gravity of the hacks during
the 2016 election, social media companies should recognize that any foreign
influence over the internet is a legitimate threat to the public’s interest. Social
media companies should acknowledge that their platforms may become a
means by which people and countries with injurious intent might choose to
launch their attacks.86 With an understanding of the injurious motives and
intent of people seeking to disrupt American society and their preferred
means and strategies for doing so, it is important to analyze the reach of
social media platforms in considering their social and ethical obligations to
monitor the content posted on their sites.
B. Social Media Platforms: Reach and Audience
Social media companies have come under the spotlight in regard to the
dissemination of fake news and inaccurate information for various reasons.
First, as stated above, there has been a sharp and significant increase in social
media use generally.87 With this increase in use, social media platforms
should be more supervisory of the content displayed on their sites, because
the impact of any one piece of content is magnified by the sites’ increasingly
large audience. Second, social networks have enabled anyone in any country
to post information, create their own content, and share links from their own
83. See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Rus-






87. See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the
2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 215 (2017).
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websites.88 Third, the fact social media platforms are designed to promote all
content (verified or not) at an expedited rate nearly ensures that fake news is
posted and re-posted without fact-checking or verification.89 In fact,
“[c]ontent can be relayed among users with no significant third party filter-
ing, fact-checking, or editorial judgment.”90 Fourth, unlimited profiles can be
created on these sites, giving hostile and anonymous forces public platform
with which to spread disinformation. The number of users associated with
these platforms and the reach of all information posted has led to a serious
debate regarding whether social media platforms are actually “public utili-
ties” and, thus, whether they should be regulated as such.
C. Social Media Platforms as “Public Utilities”
The internet has become a fundamental pillar of society today. Indispu-
tably, the internet functions as a place for gathering news and information,
building businesses, networking, and connecting.91 It functions as a platform
for communication and expression of ideas.92 This is exemplified by the in-
crease in the use of social media.93 This requires consideration as to how the
internet is regulated at a governmental level, beginning with an understand-
ing of the internet as a public utility. A “public utility” is defined as “a pri-
vate business organization, subject to governmental regulation, that provides
an essential commodity.”94 Given the influence that the internet has on soci-
ety today, it is not unreasonable to deem the internet an essential commodity.
In fact, social media sites may constitute essential commodities, because they
provide communication and interpersonal connection at a global level.
People are able to build and maintain their businesses online.95 Working
from home is possible because of the internet.96 Social media and the internet
are no longer used merely as means of entertainment; it can also account for
people’s entire livelihoods.97 The internet has allowed ordinary people and
businesses alike to reach a global audience.98 Social media and the internet
88. See id. at 214.
89. See id. at 211.
90. Id.
91. See Ambrose Thompson, Social Media as Public Expectation: The New Public







97. See Thompson, supra note 91.
98. See Thompson, supra note 91.
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also have the rare ability to equalize and humanize people of all different
races, religions, socioeconomic backgrounds, and education levels by acting
as an accessible resource for most people around the world.99 Overall, the
internet has become “a crucial aspect of how we conduct our social, political,
and professional business in the global world.”100 In addition to all of the
other relevant functions listed above, it is difficult to imagine a world as
highly-functioning as the one we live in without the presence of such ad-
vanced and important technology.101
Integral to the concept of public utilities is the idea that “the needs of
the public for access are important and must be looked out for,” despite the
fact public utilities are almost always owned and operated by for-profit cor-
porations.102 As such, public utilities generally require increased governmen-
tal oversight and regulation.103 In practice, and as it pertains to social media
and the internet, this generally “entail[s] greater regulation of those sites’
structures and business practices.”104 Historically, there have been valid argu-
ments both in support and opposition of this idea.
Understandably, proponents of the argument that social media and the
internet are utilities demand increased regulation.105 These proponents be-
lieve that since these sites have become inherent aspects of society which
would disadvantage those who do not participate, regulations should be in
place to protect personal identities, information, thoughts, and ideas.106 Pro-
ponents also argue that a lack of governmental regulation would cause these
sites and platforms to turn into a monopoly, so as to evade—intentionally or
not—any regulation or any necessary reprimand because of their sheer size
and influence.107 Essentially, proponents fear these companies, if unregu-
lated, will grow to accumulate so much power that any regulation sought to
be imposed on them in the future would be entirely ineffective, if not com-
pletely impossible.108
Opponents of that argument assert that “social media platforms do not
resemble traditional public utilities” and, therefore, should not be regulated
99. See Thompson, supra note 91.
100. Thompson, supra note 91.
101. See Thompson, supra note 91.
102. See Thompson, supra note 91.
103. See Thierer, supra note 56, at 255.
104. See Thierer, supra note 56, at 250.
105. See Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, ZEPHORIA
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as such.109 Opponents also argue treating these social media sites as public
utilities will ultimately cause them to both convert into, and function as, nat-
ural monopolies.110 Finally, opponents believe regulation inherently and con-
sistently inhibits the innovation of companies which attribute their success
almost entirely to that very innovation.111 Ultimately, the argument for or
against governmental regulation of social media and the internet is integral to
the protection and regulation of the content posted on social media and the
internet. Therefore, it is pertinent to the fundamental basis for the debate
regarding governmental regulation to analyze the First Amendment and un-
derstand its application and its limits.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CENSORING
INFORMATION
The enduring debate revolving around the First Amendment and the
ability to censor certain information has become even more relevant and
hotly-contested with the rise of social media use. Two questions seem to
arise most often when considering the topic: (1) what actual protections does
the First Amendment afford?; and (2) just how far do those protections go?
Recently, in accordance with the rise of social media and the internet, the
question of what ability social media platforms have to censor information
has arisen more and more frequently and is worth a detailed analysis. First,
however, it is important to understand the basic constructs of the First
Amendment as well as the protections it affords and the limits by which it is
constrained.
A. A General Understanding of the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expres-
sion by prohibiting Congress from restricting or limiting citizens’ right to
speak freely.112 Historically, the First Amendment issues involved in some of
the most significant cases in American history have ranged from what topics
may be discussed in high school textbooks113 to whether it is unconstitutional
to burn a flag in protest of American politics.114 The landmark case Schenck
v. United States set out the test most appropriate to determine First Amend-
ment issues.115 In its holding, the Court asserted that the question to be con-
109. See Thierer, supra note 56, at 250.
110. See Thierer, supra note 56, at 250–51.
111. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 580 (1969).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. See generally Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Com’rs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987).
114. See generally Tex. v. Johnson, 41 U.S. 397 (1989).
115. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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sidered in every First Amendment case is “whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent.”116 The Court further noted that the fundamental factors to
be considered when looking at a First Amendment case are both the proxim-
ity and the degree of the language used to the dangers that the speech might
elicit.117
The introduction of the internet required this standard to be applied in
ways not previously considered. Courts recognized early on that the internet
was “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country—
and indeed the world—has yet seen.”118 As such, the internet has provided a
forum that supports the guarantees of the First Amendment and the expres-
sion of free speech more fundamentally than, arguably, any other platform
ever created. With that type of power, however, comes a significant responsi-
bility. Both internet sites and the government have long struggled with trying
to figure out a balance in protecting free speech and free expression on in-
ternet sites. This inherently calls for some type of government regulation
which will not ultimately diminish the utility of these sites in promoting the
freedom of speech.119
This dynamic is complex and has a complicated history. When the in-
ternet first became relevant, the government required websites not discrimi-
nate against any of the content posted.120 However, as recent cases
exemplify,121 the government has begun to encourage those same sites to
discriminate against the type and substance of content posted.122 The very
fact that the government has encouraged the discrimination and self-regula-
tion of these sites in regards to the content, news, and information their users
are posting brings up a significant First Amendment problem. Specifically,
the government, in implying that sites should be posting some content but not
all of it, is effectively encouraging internet sites to regulate and discriminate
against the content posted on their sites, which is, in itself, a form of limiting
expression.123 Problems like this one have made First Amendment issues re-
garding the internet a particularly difficult topic. For that reason, it is neces-
sary to analyze the ability and responsibilities of social media platforms to
116. See id. at 52.
117. See id.
118. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
119. Dawn C. Nunziato, First Amendment Values for the Internet, 13 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 282, 308–09 (2014).
120. See id. at 282.
121. See generally Verizon v. Fed. Comm. Commission, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
122. Nunziato, supra note 119, at 282.
123. See Nunziato, supra note 119, at 295.
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monitor and regulate the content, news, and information being posted on
their individual platforms.
B. Ability of Social Media Platforms to Censor Information
The first big question at issue is whether social media and websites are
even able to censor, regulate, and monitor the information being posted on
their sites. In assessing this question, it seems that online platforms have
gone back to the initial test first set out in Schenck, which considers the
potential violence and evil that could be elicited from the deregulation of free
speech, in determining the appropriate level of regulation and restriction on
the speech and content posted. Although the Supreme Court did not discuss
free speech and the regulation of materials distributed via the internet until
1997,124 the Supreme Court has evidently long favored the idea of private
platforms having the power to regulate the content posted on their sites.
The Supreme Court’s attitude regarding the regulation of speech is
shown in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Federal Communication
Commission, where the Court advised that:
The potential for abuse of private power over a central avenue of
communication cannot be overlooked. . . . Each medium of ex-
pression must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by stan-
dards suited to it, for each may present its own problems. The
First Amendment’s command that government not impede the
freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking
steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical
control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of
information and ideas.125
Although this excerpt pertained to the ability of cable television stations to
monitor content, the idea applies to social media and websites as well.126 In
considering the internet as a content provider, it is clear these websites and
platforms “exercise substantial control of critical pathways of communica-
tion and enjoy the power to threaten the free flow of information and ideas—
power that should be held in check under a proper understanding of the First
Amendment.”127 Social media and internet companies have been censoring
the content, news, and information posted on their sites.128 These sites and
platforms get their support in censoring speech namely from the fact that
most of the platforms are privately held companies instead of public conduits
124. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
125. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994).
126. See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE
SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 2 (2009).
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128. See id.
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of speech, which could have less backing to restrict and censor the content
being shared.129
With that said, users of these sites want minimal censorship and largely
demand content only be censored for legitimate and substantial reasons. It is
widely recognized that social media and internet platforms cannot merely
silence “the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience,” but
rather may punish a speaker for speech that is “likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest.”130 This distinction has long been noted and
litigated, but the standards for what constitutes a potential “breach of peace”
such that it would require regulation and censorship has long been estab-
lished.131 In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, “breach of peace” was defined as
injurious speech which “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition or unrest, or creates a disturbance.”132 The “breach of peace”
limitation is understandable and widely accepted. The bigger issues pertain-
ing to censorship on internet sites and platforms come from smaller, less
obvious instances of censorship which draw far blurrier lines when consider-
ing First Amendment issues.
C. What Content Can Be Censored
In establishing the responsibilities and obligations social media and in-
ternet platforms have in censoring certain content, news, and information
posted on their respective sites and platforms, it is important to also under-
stand what content—if any—could be censored, as well as the parameters of
the responsibilities of social media sites for doing so. These social media and
internet platforms have the responsibility to censor information that could be
so inflammatory as to incite violence and aggression or which create a distur-
bance.133 There is no doubt these social media and internet platforms are
allowed to use their own discretion to determine what content could be seen
as so upsetting that it should not be posted on the platform. However, this
relatively broad rule that many social media and internet platforms adhere to
leaves an incredible amount of room for interpretation and discretion on the
part of the social media or internet platforms individually.
While the argument that certain content might incite violence or be so
offensive as to disrupt the public peace is one that is easily proven, it is far
more difficult to face a challenge many social media and internet platforms
have faced more recently: deciphering what news is verified and accurate and
what news is fake news. The issue confronting social media companies and
129. See id.
130. See Lidsky, supra note 21, at 153.
131. See generally Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
132. Id.
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various internet sites today is determining to what extent they have to verify
the information and news articles being circulated on their sites. There has
long been a debate regarding the protection of free speech and the ethical
implications of disseminating information which is not necessarily verified or
true.134 Specifically, it has long been debated whether information which is
knowingly untrue is protected under the guise of “free speech.”135
Joel Feinberg addresses the dichotomy between freedom of expression
and the betterment of society by categorizing ways in which misinformation
can be strictly prohibited.136 Feinberg starts his paper by explaining the views
of John Stuart Mill who believed in the totally free expression of opinion.137
Feinberg challenges Mill’s argument that the complete, unfettered, un-
restricted freedom of expression is advantageous for society and argues
against “the inalienable right to say what one pleases whether it’s good for
society or not.”138 Feinberg challenges the idea by retorting that “if liberty of
expression is justified only because it is socially useful, then some might
think that it is justified only when it is socially useful.”139 His argument per-
fectly exemplifies the inherent controversy in the relationship between the
idea of freedom of expression and the necessary regulation of certain mate-
rial. Feinberg’s paper captures the dilemma society faces where people want
to be able to spread ideas and information worth spreading but struggle with
identifying the point at which those ideas cease to be helpful and beneficial
to society.
The idea is a novel one and, in his paper, Feinberg explains that there
are a few, specific conditions under which free speech should be restricted
for the betterment of society.140 The first such category is defamation. Fein-
berg argues that defamation is one category which has the potential of caus-
ing far more harm than good.141 However, Feinberg also argues that there are
benefits to the threat of defamation, such as the fear of potential exposure
encouraging individuals to avoid wrongdoing.142 He also defends defamation
by asserting that the public’s interest in truth is so great that it should always
outweigh a private person’s interest in their reputation.143 Notably, even in
his own paper arguing for the restriction of certain speech, Feinberg cannot
134. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 380–81.
135. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 380–81.
136. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 381.
137. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 381.
138. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 381.
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help but advocate for the other side of the argument. This exemplifies the
difficulties of the argument to restrict the freedom of speech; many believe in
restricting certain speech, but nevertheless still have qualms about doing so.
In addition to defamation, Feinberg also argues that, often, the spreading
of “malicious truths,” meaning statements known to be incorrect and said
simply to incite chaos, are not helpful to society.144 Feinberg cites the 1919
landmark Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States, in which Justice
Holmes stated that even “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It
does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering works that
may have all the effect of force.”145 The idea behind Feinberg’s argument
against supporting malicious truths is that there are certain things which
should be prevented from being said so as to avoid disorder.146
Feinberg also argues, under a theory frequently called the “fighting
words doctrine,” words and rhetoric that might provoke retaliatory violence
should similarly be restricted despite protections afforded by the First
Amendment.147 Feinberg argues the law rightfully discourages uttering words
that can inflame people or that are likely to provoke a violent action.148 Ulti-
mately, Feinberg considers statements falling into any of the above enumer-
ated specific categories as either being so inflammatory and upsetting or, as
to indisputably untrue statements, offering no legitimate value to the public
at large, and is thus speech that could (and should) be rightfully restricted.149
Conversely, there are many prominent judicial theorists who believe so-
ciety should have to tolerate all speech, regardless of how inflammatory, up-
setting, or untrue. Charles Lawrence argues that if the government or any
other entity restricted an individual’s free expression merely because it was
upsetting or seemingly so outrageously untrue as to be injurious, then some
of the most significant and fundamental Supreme Court decisions would not
have ever made their way to court.150 Lawrence specifically uses Brown v.
Board of Education as an example, and argues that even though segregation
was an ingrained American truth at the time of the Brown decision, had the
suit not been brought, the issue of segregation likely would have not been
144. See Feinberg, supra note 24, at 386.
145. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
146. See Feinberg supra note 24, at 386.
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challenged, and thus, the change and betterment to society resulting from the
decision would not have occurred.151
With that said, Lawrence does make the explicit point that some hate
speech is either so racist or so otherwise hostile that it should be restricted
simply for being the epitome of speech that serves no legitimate purpose or
function and makes no legitimate point.152 He explains that the First Amend-
ment should be used for the promotion of truth.153 He also states speech con-
veyed with the sole intention of hostility does not communicate ideas but is
rather used merely to produce injury.154 He further argues speech meant to
hurt and not to inform or create dialogue could have the effect of inhibiting
the discovery of truth.155
Ultimately, the question comes down to whether certain speech which is
meant to solely hurt is still validly protected by the First Amendment. It has
long been debated whether there is an advantage to having false information
out in the public domain.156 While the theorists above seem to agree informa-
tion that is strictly injurious and provides little other benefit should not be
allowed, there is still a lingering question regarding whether having bad in-
formation helps the public discern what is right versus wrong and true versus
false.157
This perplexing question is especially critical when considering the le-
gitimate proof that inaccurate and unverified information is harming the pub-
lic in various ways, including influencing national presidential elections.158
Under such circumstances, it is essential to explore the parameters of the
responsibilities mentioned above. It is important to consider the extent of the
language allowed on these social media and internet platforms, as well as the
appropriate limits to censoring the content, news, and information posted by
active and loyal users of these sites. The ultimate issue is determining just
how explicitly inaccurate or injurious the content, news, and information can
be before it should be properly and constitutionally regulated or censored.159
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any legal guidance, leaves social media and internet companies to create their
own policies regarding fake news and censorship.
D. The Final Answer
Social media platforms walk a fine line regarding what content, news,
and information they can restrict and how they can properly and constitution-
ally do so.160 Courts have opined that “a social media platform amplifies the
distribution of the speaker’s message—which favors . . . free speech inter-
ests—but also increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for . . .
disruption.”161 The analysis gets even more challenging when considering
how free speech affects American citizens. While there are certain ideas that
can be legitimately restricted because they are indisputably considered to in-
cite violence or be generally offensive, the majority of the content posted and
promoted on social media sites constitute, the legitimate thoughts and feel-
ings of the public.162 And, while those ideas might be offensive to some, it is
important to recognize they often represent another person’s truth.163 Further,
the expression of those truths forms the foundation of a democratic, open
society.164
The ability to express unpopular feelings in the face of oppression or
conflict, or in the face of the people in power, is a fundamental pillar of the
freedom upon which the United States was built and prides itself.165 To re-
strict the speech of one initiates a slippery slope which could result in a
larger restriction on many.166 Nevertheless, social media sites have been
used, in the past years more than ever, to “promote hateful rhetoric, to con-
trol . . . citizens, and to silence any opposition.”167 Thus, despite the difficul-
ties, criticism, and backlash social media companies might face, they have a
responsibility to monitor the content posted and promoted on their sites.168
The following section analyzes and provides a suggestion regarding the most
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V. CONFRONTING AND HANDLING THE PROBLEM
As exemplified in this Comment, the reach of social media platforms
has increased significantly in recent years. The far-reaching influence of
these social media platforms dictates new responsibilities, duties, ethical and
moral obligations, and creates novel challenges.169 Specifically, social media
sites must learn how to balance the freedom of expression with the ability to
monitor and restrict the content, news, and information posted on their
sites.170 Social media platforms must realize they have an absolute duty to
both American citizens and users around the world to promote accurate infor-
mation, to restrict hateful and hostile ideas that might incite violence, and to
be responsible for the content promoted on its platforms.
Social networks are faced with a catch-22.171 As exemplified above,
there is incredible resistance coming with attempts to restrict any form of
expression. However, social media companies have also faced criticism for
not adequately monitoring the information posted on their sites which causes
them to function as a vehicle for the dissemination of fake news.172 So what
is the best solution for social media platforms? And how should they handle
this issue to satisfy both proponents of regulation and proponents of free
speech? The rest of this section will explore suggestions to confront this dif-
ficult balancing act.
A. Monitoring Users
Social media platforms should start by ensuring that the users creating
the profiles are actual human beings. Social media sites often allow users to
have multiple profiles.173 In doing so, social media sites are essentially al-
lowing users to abuse its platforms by allowing anyone to create accounts for
“bots” or use multiple accounts to amplify their messages.174 This phenome-
non is exemplified by Facebook’s recent reveal that there are an estimated
169. See Elsayed-Ali, supra note 159.
170. See Elsayed-Ali, supra note 159.
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eighty-three million fake profiles on Facebook.175 Requiring social networks
to verify its users would prevent this abuse.
In addition, allowing users to maintain multiple profiles ultimately gives
them the ability to separate their public persona from their private one. In so
doing, individuals can completely disassociate views and opinions they
might hold privately from the views they convey publicly. Specifically, in
maintaining multiple, distinct profiles on social media platforms, individuals
can create one account publicly portraying an image of themselves which
they prefer but also allows for them to post ideas on a separate, more private,
or unaffiliated account, allowing them to speak their mind with no
repercussions.
While the public persona connected to a person’s public profile (the
profile chosen by the user to be viewable by all) might reflect accepted socie-
tal views, the alternate profiles disassociated with the user’s public persona
allow users to remain somewhat anonymous. Thus, users are allowed to post
whatever opinions or ideas they desire regardless of how opinionated or in-
flammatory. While this could potentially be helpful for individuals seeking
support in online groups and who would like to remain anonymous for legiti-
mate reasons, it also allows individuals posting hostile or hateful speech to
similarly remain anonymous and escape being held responsible for the ideas
and rhetoric they promote online.
Further, allowing this kind of unaccountability for posts that might be
hateful or hostile can have additional significant consequences. For example,
many anonymous users promoting hateful views could unite under their ali-
ases and unaffiliated personas to form hate groups. It could additionally al-
low for the promotion, and even rise, of anonymous figures who promote
radical and inflammatory information and opinions. However, by allowing
users to maintain only one profile, social media platforms could hold users
accountable for the content they post. Users will likely be less willing to
promote views and ideas that are hostile, hateful, or socially unacceptable if
they know they will be publicly associated with those views. This alone
could prevent a substantial amount of hateful speech from occurring simply
by deterring it through holding those with hateful views accountable.
Some might oppose this view and advocate for the ability to speak and
express ideas anonymously. Opponents to this idea might argue anonymity
online also has significant benefits to users who might need to remain anony-
mous for reasons legitimately in their interest. This is a valid point. There are
certainly forums in which people should be able to express their ideas, opin-
ions, and feelings anonymously. There are people who might suffer from
very personal issues which are best handled when a person can hide their
identities from the public at large through an alias or alternate persona. How-
ever, with the advancement of technology, there are surely ways in which a
person could join a group anonymously while still maintaining only a single
profile.
175. See id.
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Social media platforms, with ever-developing algorithms and coding ad-
vancements, should be tasked with creating a safe way for users to create or
be assigned usernames which protect their identities when joining certain
groups. Certain types of groups, such as support groups, should allow ano-
nymity, and social media sites and platforms should be responsible for facili-
tating a safe way for users to participate anonymously in these groups.
However, social media sites should similarly have the ability to monitor
these groups and the happenings within each group. Sites and platforms
should monitor what the groups are being used for: support groups should be
monitored to ensure anonymity and support purposes, and groups promoting
hateful and hostile ideas and rhetoric should be monitored to prevent the
incitement of violence.
While many may argue that even those who participate in the promotion
of hate speech should be afforded the protections of the First Amendment as
well as anonymity in promoting their ideas, the two arguments are somewhat
contradictory; it seems entirely unproductive to fight to protect the right to
freely express ideas with which you are not willing to personally associate. It
is one thing to want to remain anonymous in seeking support for issues with
which one needs legitimate help, especially in instances where one might not
yet be ready to handle the response they might receive from their community.
It is another thing entirely to protect those who are using a separate persona
to promote hate and to commune and organize with others with similar hate-
ful ideas and opinions. Forcing people to maintain only one profile, and thus
holding them accountable for their posts and opinions, will subsequently en-
courage people to still share their ideas and personal views but to do so with-
out promoting violence. In implementing this idea, social media platforms
should use the resources available to ensure that users are creating and main-
taining only one profile and that the individuals behind each profile are actu-
ally people, rather than governmental entities, bots, hackers, or those using
multiple profiles solely to reach larger audiences for injurious reasons.
B. Monitoring Groups
In addition to a formal strategy for filtering out users with multiple
profiles, I would suggest that social media platforms similarly have a func-
tion for filtering groups created on their sites. Many social media sites allow
for the creation of “groups” which generally consist of individual users who
come together to discuss a certain topic.176 While these groups often serve as
support systems for individual users or constitute a healthy discussion board,
they also have the potential to be a main source of hateful and hostile speech
176. See generally How Does Facebook Suggest Groups For Me to Join?, FACE-
BOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/1210322209008185/?helpref=hc_fnav
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (explaining that Facebook suggests groups a certain
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2018] When Lies Go Viral 343
or false and inaccurate information.177 Accordingly, social media sites have a
responsibility to implement a monitoring or filtering system identifying spe-
cific groups which may pose problems, frequently promote hateful and hos-
tile ideas, or post materials that could incite violence.178 The advancement of
technology has certainly made available resources which social media plat-
forms could utilize to find certain groups or community-targeted pages that
might raise problems.
Monitoring online groups would also allow social networks to identify
individuals posting hateful ideas or false information. Assuming those who
post strongly-opinionated material online surround themselves with other
like-minded individuals and users,179 online groups likely will identify more
people with similar beliefs. In the case of users who hold hateful and hostile
ideas, this feature would be especially beneficial in providing the site or plat-
form with the opportunity to ensure that the user’s hostile or hateful beliefs
are not substantiated or furthered by fake news. Specifically, sites can ensure
the algorithms which determine what content to promote on a user’s feed are
not promoting the continuation of the user’s hateful beliefs.
If preventing the use of certain groups or group pages is impractical or
even impossible, social media sites should still be responsible for warning
about any biased or potentially inaccurate content that could be posted on
such pages, and this content should raise red flags to the site. Groups tending
to promote strong feelings regarding a controversial topic might be spreading
misinformation from unreliable sources, knowingly or not. Misinformation
and fake news are exactly what social media companies have the ability and
responsibility to filter out and prevent from being spread.
Alternatively, a strategy for social media companies to filter through
accurate content, news, and information and to distinguish it from fake news
might be to identify sources that are generally considered reliable. Many so-
cial media companies identify and verify the personal, online accounts of
high-profile individuals and celebrities. These companies could easily do the
same for reliable news sources. In practice, this would mean articles written
and/or posted by trustworthy publications such as The New York Times, The
Huffington Post, academic journals, or other reliable and unbiased news sites
would be designated in some way as a dependable source. The lack of such
designation would subsequently alert people to the possibility of inaccurate,
biased, or false information contained in any given post. If unable to effec-
tively sort through information and to filter out unreliable sources and arti-
177. See Hate on Social Media, SAFEHOME.ORG, https://www.safehome.org/re-
sources/hate-on-social-media/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
178. See Elsayed-Ali, supra note 159.
179. See Definition of Groupthink, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/groupthink (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (“A
pattern of thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture of con-
sent, and conformity to group values and ethics.”).
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cles, then social media platforms have, at the least, the duty to warn readers
and users about the possibility of misinformation.
C. Monitoring Information
In accordance with the sentiments of Justice Holmes in his opinion
stated above,180 individuals should not be allowed to knowingly and mali-
ciously promote false or inaccurate information. Thus, social media plat-
forms have a responsibility to filter through the content posted on their sites
and remove any false content, news, and information.181 While this may be a
burdensome and laborious task to impose on social media platforms, it is,
nonetheless, entirely necessary. Because social media platforms are responsi-
ble for promoting ideas on a scale far larger than what people would nor-
mally have access to, these companies also have a duty to ensure the
information being promoted has at least some modicum of merit.182 Despite
the arguments from the theorists cited above which consider the advantages
and benefits of exposure to clearly inaccurate information, knowingly pro-
moting false information on such a wide scale, or not caring about the accu-
racy of the information being disseminated, is a violation of an ethical duty
that all social media platforms have to the public.
While this duty might not have been as prevalent when these platforms
were initially created, with the growth and increased use of these sites and
platforms, and with the reach and number of users who rely on the informa-
tion distributed on these sites and platforms, it is entirely fair to hold social
media platforms responsible for the information its sites promote.183 This
kind of regulation can take many forms. Social media companies might em-
ploy a formal fact-checker to verify the content being posted. They might
utilize the above strategy of identifying and verifying consistently reliable
news sources. Alternatively, social networks could develop automated sys-
tems for identifying extreme headlines or certain sources that are consistently
unreliable. Whatever the strategy, social media companies absolutely have
the responsibility to use their resources to implement some sort of regulating
or monitoring system which prevents the dissemination of blatantly false or
inaccurate information.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increased use of technology in society today has allowed for the
creation of platforms that reach more individuals than ever before.184 People
180. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
181. See Schaper, supra note 172.
182. See Schaper, supra note 172.
183. See Elsayed-Ali, supra note 159.
184. See Social Media Statistics and Facts, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/top-
ics/1164/social-networks/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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can connect to others in different countries through social media sites that are
used daily by a significant percentage of the world’s population.185 With the
number of different social media platforms available to users and consumers
today, and with the numerous types and forms of technologies that consum-
ers and users can use to access these social media platforms, the prevalence
of these platforms is only projected to grow.186
While the increased use of social media has hugely beneficial implica-
tions for the platforms themselves and for technology generally, the conse-
quences that accompany the changes in the use of any technology must be
considered and dealt with appropriately. As recent events have shown, social
media platforms specifically have been used for both beneficial and detri-
mental purposes.187 A fundamental function of these social media platforms,
which has been highlighted through the increased use of these various plat-
forms, is that the messages people convey on these sites and platforms, and
the information posted, have a significant reach.188
Unfortunately, this particular function of these sites has been used to
spread hateful rhetoric and blatantly false news and information.189 The nega-
tive consequences resulting from the spread of this hateful and inaccurate
information have caused society to hold social media platforms responsible
for this dissemination of misinformation190 and have, subsequently, placed a
duty on social media platforms to filter the information and messages being
expressed and promoted on their sites.191 Though at first glance, this respon-
sibility may appear to place an undue burden on social networks, in reality,
there are many means for these companies to reasonably monitor the content
on their sites.192 Whether social media companies choose to regulate the in-
formation, the sources, or the users themselves, these companies have a re-
sponsibility to ensure they are not promoting hateful speech or fake news.193
For that reason, this Comment suggests social media platforms implement
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The First Amendment considerations accompanying this kind of burden
are substantial.194 Social media platforms are used to connect with others,
collect information, and express ideas. However, these platforms are increas-
ingly being used to promote hateful and hostile ideas and rhetoric.195 Hateful
messages that are sufficiently offensive or hostile warrant regulation. While
it is true the First Amendment protects the expression of free speech and thus
protects many of the ideas and opinions promoted on social media sites, the
First Amendment does not protect any form of expression which is so offen-
sive as to incite violence, and it does not protect blatantly false speech.196
For that reason, social media platforms have a responsibility and duty to
their users, American citizens, and the world at large to monitor what is be-
ing posted on their sites so as to prevent the spread fake news and discourage
speech that is hateful and hostile. Further, users of social media sites should
demand accountability from social media companies and hold them responsi-
ble for the information they are distributing. The reach, use, and reliance on
social media platforms mandates that these platforms implement some proce-
dure by which to balance the freedom of expression with the regulation of
harmful messages and fake news.
194. See Lawrence & Gunther, supra note 150.
195. Hate on Social Media, supra note 177.
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